An inferential articulation of metaphorical assertions

This paper argues for the view that metaphors are assertions by locating metaphor within our social discursive practices of asserting and inferring. The literal and the metaphorical differ not in the stating of facts nor in the representation of states of affairs but in the kind of inferential involvements they have and the normative score-keeping practices within which the inferential connections are articulated. This inferentialist based account of metaphor is supplemented by insights from accommodation theory. The account is significant for our understanding of both metaphor‟s figurativeness and cognitive content

The Logic of Consciencism

According to Kwame Nkrumah, the conscience of the African society is plagued with three strands of influences which have competing and conflicting ideologies: “African society has one segment which comprises our traditional way of life; it has a second segment which is filled by the presence of the Islamic tradition in Africa; it has a final segment which represents the infiltration of the Christian tradition and culture of Western Europe into Africa, using colonialism and neocolonialism as its primary vehicles.” When these three segments with their conflicting ideologies are allowed to co-exist, the African society “will be racked by the most malignant schizophrenia.” Nkrumah’s solution, philosophical consciencism, presents an ideology aimed at achieving a harmony among the three segments in such a way that is “in tune with the original humanist principles underlying African society.” I do two main things in this paper: first, I present an analysis and critique of Nkrumah’s understanding of how the harmony is to be achieved in African societies; and second, I show how the theoretical ideas of philosophical consciencism – materialism, dialectical change, categorial conversion, socialism – are given actual form and content on the social-political scene through an analysis of Nkrumah's set theoretic term

Understanding assertion and truth in relation to metaphor

The central question I engage with in this dissertation is this: are declarative metaphorical sentences truth-evaluable? I pursue an affirmative answer to this question within a pragmatic framework that does not (1) reduce the metaphorical to the literal, (2) appraise the metaphorical in terms of the literal, and (3) provide a sui generis kind of 'metaphorical truth'. In presenting this answer, I show, on the one hand, that other positive responses in terms of speaker meaning (Searle 1993; Moran 1989; Camp 2006) and pragmatic enrichment (Bezuidenhout, 2001; Recanati 2004) are inadequate, and, on the other hand, that the main reasons proffered for the denial of the truth-aptness of metaphorical sentences, in the literature, are unsatisfactory. I do this by arguing, in Chapter I, that characterizing metaphor in seeing-as experiential or phenomenological terms is not incompatible with appraising metaphors for truth when the notion of understanding metaphors is construed in terms of ability to use them; in Chapter II, that a causal explanation of metaphors (Davidson, 1979; Cooper, 1984; Rorty, 1987; Lepore & Stone, 2010) does not successfully justify denial of the content of metaphors, and that the normative practices involved in the use of metaphors – engaging in genuine disagreements, using metaphors in reasoning, endorsing and retracting metaphors – attest to the fact that associated with metaphors are contents that are propositional in nature. In Chapters III and IV I argue that the pragmatic criterion – inviting others to do something (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994; Blackburn, 1984, 1998), the psychological criterion – non-expression of belief (Blackburn, 1984; Davies 1984), and the semantic criterion – non-assertion of claims (Loewenberg, 1975; Davies 1982), are all not appropriate determinants of the truth-evaluability of metaphors. To evaluate metaphors qua metaphors for truth, I draw on Brandom's (1983, 1994, 2000) inferentialist pragmatics, in Chapter V, in providing an articulation of the use of metaphors in terms of inferring and the undertaking of commitments. The overall thesis for this dissertation is that, an inferential articulation of metaphors that approaches the central question from the pragmatics of what we do in using metaphors is apt for understanding metaphorical sentences as propositionally contentful and truth-evaluable

Determinants of Capital Flight In Ghana

The study investigated the short-run and long-run determinants of capital flight in Ghana using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimation technique. The long-run and short-run results show that real GDP growth rate, higher domestic real interest rate over foreign interest rate, financial development, good governance and strong property rights reduce capital flight, while external debt to GDP leads to increase in capital flight in Ghana. However, lagged external debt to GDP and lagged financial development had negative and positive effect respectively in the short-run. The study recommends that government should adopt more pro-growth policies and resort to domestic borrowing to reduce external debt. The Central Bank of Ghana should improve on the development of the financial sector and ensure competitive domestic interest rates. It is also recommended that Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in Ghana should continue to ensure accountability and transparency to strengthen the interest of domestic investors

Semantic Meaning and Content: The Intractability of Metaphor

Davidson argues that metaphorical sentences express no propositional contents other than the explicit literal contents they express. He offers a causal account, on the one hand, as an explanation of the supposed additional content of a metaphor in terms of the effects metaphors have on hearers, and on the other hand, as a reason for the non-propositional nature of the “something more” that a metaphor is alleged to mean. Davidson’s account is meant to restrict the semantic notions of meaning, content, and truth, to literal sentences. I argue that the Davidsonian causal account does not satisfactorily account for metaphor’s figurativeness, speakers’ assertion and hearers’ uptake of metaphor, and our discursive practices of using metaphors in disagreements and argumentation. I offer a non-compositional analysis of a semantic account of metaphor within which one can make sense of the applicability of the notions of meaning and content to metaphor. This analysis shows that metaphorical sentences have meanings other than, and in addition to, their literal meanings and what speakers can use them to mean

Resemblance and Identity in Wallace Stevens' Conception of Metaphor

Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians conceived of metaphor as a figure of speech in which one thing is given a name or an attribute of another thing on the basis of some resemblance that exists between the two things. Wallace Stevens conceived of metaphor not as the production of pre-existing resemblances observed in nature but the “creation of resemblance by the imagination” (NA: 72). Resemblance, and not identity, according to Stevens, is the fundamental relation between the two terms of metaphor. This is akin to contemporary accounts of metaphor in terms of the phenomenological or experiential seeing of one thing as another thing (Yoos 1971; Davidson 1979; Camp 2006a,b; Semino 2008; Ritchie 2013). Seeing one thing as another thing on the basis of resemblance or similarity implies that the one thing is not the other. I do two main things in this paper: one, I appraise the theoretical value of Wallace Stevens’ conception of metaphor as the creation of resemblance by the imagination; and two, I pose a challenge to the view that takes resemblance as fundamental to metaphor, arguing that in the cases I present, thinking of the relation as identity and not resemblance, concurs with our ontological commitments to the things compared in the metaphor. In the final analysis, I suggest that Stevens conception of metaphor as metamorphosis can meet the challenge: rather than thinking of the ‘is’ (identity) of metaphor as an ‘as’ (resemblance), for Stevens, the ‘as’ (resemblance) of metaphor metamorphosize into an ‘is’ (identity)

William Abraham: The Mind of Africa

A journey through The Mind of Africa offers one a breath-taking scenery of the cultural traditions, practices, and conceptions of African societies. Interlacing his exposition with proverbs and sayings, Abraham offers unique perspectives and interpretations of the Akan culture and conceptual scheme – Akan cultural values, social and political institutions, metaphysical conceptions of man and society – as paradigmatic of the culture and conceptual schemes of African societies. But crucially, Abraham reveals, examines, and rejects, a plethora of unfounded notions about Africans and their cultures – some of these erroneous ideas are often repackaged and recited even in present times. In reading the book, one will come to understand and appreciate the theoretical underpinnings and the practical significance of the African experienc

Metaphor, Truth, and Representation

Do metaphorical sentences express facts or represent states of affairs in the world? Can a metaphorical statement tell us ‘what there is’? These questions raise the issue of whether metaphors can be used to make truth-claims; that is, whether metaphors can be regarded as assertions that can be evaluated as true or false. Some theorists on metaphor have argued for a negative answer to the above-mentioned questions. They have claimed, among others, that metaphorical utterances are non-descriptive uses of language (Blackburn 1998); truth is not the constitutive aim of metaphors (Lamarque and Olsen 1994); metaphorical sentences do not have propositional contents (Davidson 1979; Cooper 1986; Rorty 1987, 1989; Lepore and Stone 2010, 2015); metaphorical utterances are neither assertions nor expressions of beliefs (Loewenberg 1973, 1975; Davies 1982; Davies 1984; Blackburn, 1984). I discuss a particular view, Metaphorical Expressivism, which exploits the relationship between truth, belief and assertion, and argues for the irrelevancy of truth to metaphors on the premise that metaphorical utterances do not count as assertions and that they do not count as the expression of beliefs. The denial of the truth-evaluability of metaphors on this view, I argue, is a product of an unmotivated tendency to see truth and meaning in terms of the portrayal of facts and a commitment to two untenable principles: literalism and representationalism

Consciencism, Ubuntu, and Justice

Mkhwanazi (2017) has argued that Consciencism is an “expression of ubuntu” and that it “represents the essential elements of ubuntu”. Both Consciencism and ubuntu, according to him, are engaged with the re-humanization of African society for they both advocate for the restitution of humanist and egalitarian principles found in traditional African societies. In this paper, we argue that while Consciencism and ubuntu share common principles, the one cannot be understood as an expression or representation of the other. Rather, the principles they share should be understood as emanating from, and animated by, a primary source: traditional African communalism. This primary source is a true reflection and evidence of the commonality of the philosophical underpinnings of African thought – Consciencism, rooted in Akan (Ghanaian) thought and practices, and ubuntu, which is rooted in the thought and practices of peoples of Southern Africa. We highlight the significant differences between Consciencism as a philosophical system and ubuntu as an ethic or worldview of practical action, and in particular, their responses to the issue of justice. We submit that Consciencism can embrace the ethic of ubuntu in its harmonization of the conflicting heritages of African society; and that ubuntu can evolve into a system of thought by taking a cue from the systematicity and coherence of the philosophical anchoring of Consciencism